Rutigliano online dating
Before JACOBS and CHIN, Circuit Judges, and WOLFORD, District Judge. We reject Rutigliano's contention that he was prosecuted for conduct outside the statute of limitations period. In arguing manufactured venue, defendants implicitly concede that their acts extended into the Southern District while arguing in effect that the Court should disregard these acts because the government induced them to be made in the Southern District. We have, however, previously recognized the possibility that, under certain circumstances, venue manipulation might be improper. Rowe, 414 F.3d 271, 277 (2d Cir.2005) (internal alteration and quotation marks omitted). Cir.1996) (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also United States v. As we have recently explained, however, that inquiry is made only if “the defendant argues that his prosecution in the contested district will result in a hardship to him, prejudice him, or undermine the fairness of his trial.” Id. We held that interest payments made by wire over an indefinite and prolonged period eventually ceased to be overt acts in furtherance of a conspiracy. Salmonese, 352 F.3d 608 (2d Cir.2003), that a conspirator's receipt of anticipated benefits within the limitations period can, by itself, constitute an overt act in furtherance of an ongoing conspiracy. at 991; and evidence at trial sufficiently demonstrated that the coconspirators were aware of their continuing duty to keep the RRB apprised as to their ability to work and physical condition, id. All former railroad employees receiving RRB disability payments received a yearly notice setting forth their obligation to inform the RRB of any improvement in their physical condition. Lesniewski, an orthopedic physician, and Marie Baran, a former RRB employee, were convicted by a jury in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Marrero, J.) of (variously) conspiracy to commit mail fraud, wire fraud, and health care fraud, as well as substantive counts of these offenses, and one count of making false statements. We hold that venue was proper, that defendants cannot succeed on a theory of manufactured venue, and that no “substantial contacts” inquiry is required where (as here) the defendants did not argue that prosecution in the Southern District of New York caused them hardship, prejudice, or otherwise undermined the fairness of their trial. In addition to obtaining his own fraudulent disability benefits, Rutigliano helped other LIRR employees make false claims of disability, charging “around a thousand dollars” per application. We therefore conclude that the government presented sufficient evidence that the “acts constituting” the substantive health care fraud crime, and the conspiracy to commit that crime, implicated the Southern, as well as the Eastern, Districts. See Rommy, 506 F.3d at 127 (“[T]his court has never vacated a conviction on the basis of manufactured venue.”). Al–Talib, 55 F.3d 923, 929 (4th Cir.1995) (“There is no such thing as ‘manufactured venue’ or ‘venue entrapment.’ ”). 21 (2d Cir.1982) (observing that venue might not be proper where the prosecution “lures a defendant to a distant district for some minor event simply to establish venue” in a preferred jurisdiction).“Venue in federal criminal cases is controlled by a complicated interplay of constitutional provisions, statutes, and rules.” United States v. Coplan, 703 F.3d 46, 80 (2d Cir.2012) (some internal quotation marks omitted). The conspiracy in Grimm was to manipulate the interest rate set in a specific type of municipal investment contract that, by regulation, was supposed to be set by competitive bidding. The Court thus recognized an exception to the ordinary rule set out in United States v. Consistent with precedent in and outside this Circuit, Grimm explained that “a conspiracy ends notwithstanding the receipt of anticipated profits where the payoff merely consists of a lengthy, indefinite series of ordinary, typically noncriminal, unilateral actions and there is no evidence that any concerted activity posing the special societal dangers of conspiracy is still taking place.” 738 F.3d at 502 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). Rutigliano and his coconspirators engaged, within the limitations period, in “measures of concealment” and “other corrupt intervention.” Id. Thus, Rutigliano and his coconspirators mailed false disability re-certification forms to the RRB in order to secure continued payments; cooperating witnesses testified that they filled out the re-certification form because it was “required to continue to get your railroad disability,” Trial Tr.
Baran filled out the fraudulent applications with little input from her clients; advised them on how to answer questions from the RRB; and gave them pointers on how to avoid suspicion by, for example, continuing to visit doctors after submitting their disability applications. Substantial contacts takes into account a number of factors including the situs of the defendant's acts, the elements and nature of the crime, [and] the locus of the effect of the criminal conduct. Rutigliano was convicted of multiple counts of substantive mail fraud and wire fraud, and one count of making false statements. The defendants also challenge the court's instructions to the jury on the conspiracy charge, and on the meaning of “occupational disability.”I“Both the Sixth Amendment and Fed. “When a federal statute defining an offense does not specify how to determine where the crime was committed,” we look to the “nature of the crime alleged and the location of the act or acts constituting it.” Id. For an offense deemed to be “continuing,” venue may be proper in more than one location. Kim, 246 F.3d 186, 191 (2d Cir.2001) (explaining that venue in a continuing offense is “proper in any district in which the offense began, continued, or concluded”). For venue purposes, it therefore matters that the fraudulently obtained disability annuity payments were wired through the Southern District. 236 (1944) (recognizing that “Congress may, to be sure, provide that the locality of a crime shall extend over the whole area through which force propelled by an offender operates”).
The coconspirators did so in order to perpetuate their fraud, and thereby secure continued receipt of the disability benefits that were the object of the scheme. It was likewise clear to Baran, as a former RRB employee, that the scheme would entail mailing to the RRB forms reporting the conspirators' fitness. Defendants concede that venue lies where a wire in furtherance of a scheme begins its course, continues or ends. Gilboe, 684 F.2d 235, 239 (2d Cir.1982) (“[T]he proceeds of the fraud were all transferred through New York so that such commerce moved from, through, or into the Southern District of New York.
Kozeny, 667 F.3d 122, 139 (2d Cir.2011).1As to the mail fraud conspiracy and substantive mail fraud counts, the government adduced evidence that conspirators, including Rutigliano, responded to an inquiry from the RRB by mailing false disability re-certification forms to an RRB address in the Southern District of New York. Accordingly, the “acts constituting the [mail fraud] crime” clearly “implicate” the Southern District, rendering venue there proper. Lesniewski himself completed periodic “sickness benefit” forms for his patients to enable them to receive additional fraudulent benefits, and completed additional periodic forms to submit to private insurers to obtain unwarranted benefits. Ramirez–Amaya, 812 F.2d 813, 816 (2d Cir.1987) (concluding flight over “body of water that lies within the joint jurisdiction of the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York ․ was sufficient to make venue in the Southern District proper”).
Applins, 637 F.3d 59, 72 (2d Cir.2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). Rutigliano's challenge to this instruction is without merit.
“The defendant bears the burden of showing that the requested instruction accurately represented the law in every respect and that, viewing as a whole the charge actually given, he was prejudiced.” Id. Kopstein, 759 F.3d 168, 172 (2d Cir.2014) ( “Instructions are erroneous if they mislead the jury as to the correct legal standard or do not adequately inform the jury of the law.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). He cannot demonstrate that his requested charge “accurately represented the law in every respect.” Applins, 637 F.3d at 72.